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Introduction 
The recent decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court that cleared the way for President 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez to run for an unprecedented second term appeared to have realized the most 
profound desires of Colombians of a more conservative persuasion. Indeed, early indications are 
that Uribe, with an approval rating hovering well over fifty percent, will cruise effortlessly to an 
unprecedented, and hitherto unconstitutional, second mandate. However, hardly was the ink dry 
on the Constitutional Court’s decision than hero of the hard line, take-no-prisoners strategy in the 
war against Colombia’s insurgents appeared to reverse course and agree to negotiate with 
Colombia’s two main insurgent groups.  
As recently as last summer, Colombian military officers were convinced that, under Uribe, their 
country had reached a historic turning point in its long and tumultuous conflict. Civil-military 
relations have stabilized under the leadership of a strong president who protects the military’s 
core competencies from civilian encroachment. The restructuring and professionalization of 
Colombia’s military, in the works since the 1990s, has transformed the once lethargic Colombian 
armed forces into an offensive-minded organization that appears to have the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s primary insurgent group, on the run. At the 
same time, Uribe has successfully negotiated the disarmament of several “fronts” of the right-
wing Autodefensas Unitas de Colombia (AUC). The military stands high in public esteem. 
“Democratic Security,” Uribe’s aggressive strategy for reclaiming the countryside from the 
insurgents and paramilitaries, has increased investor confidence.  
In what appeared to be a surprising volte face, however, on December 13, 2005, the Casa Nariño, 
the Presidential Palace in Bogotá, revealed that 180 kilometers of Colombian hinterland would be 
“demilitarized” to provide a secure venue to negotiate a “humanitarian agreement” with the FARC. 
For cognoscenti of Colombia’s conflict, Uribe’s concession recalled a similar exercise carried out 
by his predecessor Andrés Pastrana, now Colombia’s ambassador to Washington, who handed 
over a “despeje” or “cleared zone” to the FARC in the south of the country as a precondition for 
months of fruitless negotiations with the insurgents. Furthermore, conversations with the enemies 
of the Colombian state appeared to have become the new modus operandi for this president—
Uribe has already initiated negotiations with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), a smaller 
insurgent group, which are on-going in Havana.  
This opening to the insurgency is certainly a tactical adjustment, rather than a major re-
assessment of policy and strategy, however. First, there is a major difference between the huge, 
Switzerland-size swath of despeje the FARC utilized to grow coca and secrete kidnap victims 
until it was reoccupied in 2002 by the Colombian military, and a smaller, demilitarized area under 
the supervision of the three European countries—France, Spain and Switzerland—that will 
supervise the negotiations. 
Second, it is unlikely that Uribe, unlike Pastrana, expects anything to come of talks aimed to 
broker an exchange of a cohort of FARC hostages that include politicians, soldiers, students and 
foreigners, for five hundred guerrillas in government hands. The FARC is unlikely to hand Uribe a 
political success of that magnitude on the eve of the election. More likely, Uribe’s decision to 
negotiate is a pre-electoral maneuver to soften his hard-line image with moderate Colombians. As 
a general rule, presidents tend to move toward the center in their quest for a second mandate. In 
Colombia, this makes special sense as the majority Liberal Party is engaged in one of its periodic 
migrations leftward, which will no doubt leave some moderate voters looking for other options. 
The President has also surprised some of his closest advisors by hanging tough with Washington 
on the Free Trade Agreement, and recommending, against the advice of the business community 
with which he has close links, a significant raise in the minimum wage.[1] 
It must also be recognized that on the war front, Uribe has also become a victim of his own 
success. The military offensives launched from 2002 under the banner of Uribe’s “Democratic 
Security” strategy, broke the FARC’s stranglehold on Bogotá, reopened many of the nation’s 
main thoroughfares, disrupted the clandestine “corridors” used by the FARC to transport arms, 
drugs and soldiers, and has driven the insurgents into the more remote areas of the country. Now 
that the enemy no longer lurks at the gate, Colombians have shifted their attentions from the war 
to the economy. Therefore, Colombia’s “war president” must redefine and reposition himself with 
the voters. Of no group is this more true than the families of Colombia’s kidnapped victims, 
estimated at over four thousand people, and their supporters who have waged a high profile 
campaign against Uribe’s hitherto iron refusal to negotiate with the FARC lest it accord them 
combatant status in international law.[2]  
All of this makes perfect sense. But where does it leave Colombian civil-military relations? 
Colombian soldiers have been here before, in the 1960s and late 1970s when they sensed that a 
military victory apparently within their grasp was squandered by politicians who fundamentally 
distrust and historically under-resource the military. Colombian presidents Belisario Betencur 
(1982-1986) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) both negotiated with the insurgents, who simply 
used the discussions to buy time, and gain publicity and a degree of legitimacy from a peace 
process that they were never serious about seeing through to fruition. The consensus among 
soldiers has been that continued success in the war hinges on the continuity of Uribe’s 
administration. Otherwise, Colombia’s endemic structural problems are likely to resurface, among 
them economic over-dependence on U.S. and Venezuelan markets, poor infrastructure, an 
overvalued peso, and dropping oil revenues, not to mention the conflagration in the countryside. 
A return to political instability could be a real disincentive to investment and trigger an economic 
downturn, as well as result in the surrender many of the hard won gains made by the military 
against the insurgents since Uribe took office in 2002.[3] 
Uribe’s first three years in office have witnessed a marked improvement in civil-military relations, 
at least as far as the presidency is concerned. The new Colombian president understood that the 
military sought a commander-in-chief willing to lead the nation in wartime. “The military always felt 
that it was fighting the war alone, that no one was paying attention,” Sergio Jaramillo, ex-aide to 
former Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez, believes. “Uribe made the military feel that they 
are appreciated, that the government is behind them. Uribe has the authority to make things 
happen.”[4] One of the things he made happen within a week of taking office was to declare a 
state of emergency that imposed press censorship, removed elected officials who “contribute to 
public turmoil,” and bestowed sweeping powers on the security forces in tumultuous areas of the 
country.[5] 
The militarization of strategy, the desire to take the war to the FARC, all appeal to a military that 
sees negotiations with the enemy as closely akin to treason, and who historically has done 
everything in their power to sabotage them. "Uribe had the advantage that the military like him, 
and are more subordinated to the president,” notes Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Director of 
the Division of Justice and Security in the National Department of Planning.[6] 
But while those who equate Uribe’s survival with that of Colombia are obsessed with the road he 
takes to work each day, Uribe’s leadership style is a very personal one that has come at the price 
of institution building—the National Security Council seldom meets, while senior generals by-pass 
their civilian “superiors” in a largely toothless Ministry of Defense to deal directly with the 
president. Congressional oversight of the military is largely is a fiction of the 1991 constitution. 
“The style of this president is to call subordinate commanders directly,” is how retired U.S. Air 
Force General and Latin American specialist Richard Goetze puts it. “This undermines the 
minister of defense. It undermines the military chain of command as well. This damages the 
concept of civil-military relations. This is a strategic vulnerability. The president is not allowing 
institutions to be built. And this is not just in defense. The minister of foreign relations is ? lvaro 
Uribe. He deals directly with the United States. There is no coordination. It’s a one-man show.”[7] 
Others claim that Uribe’s tenure has accelerated a trend of the fragmentation and marginalization 
of the political parties, vital building blocks of democracy, as well as of environmental laws and 
some of the fundamental social and civic rights built into the 1991 Constitution.[8] 
Uribe’s decision to engage the State’s enemies at the conference table is not without dangers. A 
faltering of resolve in the war against the insurgency, combined with the endemic weakness of 
Colombian political parties,[9] would strengthen the autodefensas –paramilitary groups that have 
proliferated in Colombia since the 1990s in reaction to the government’s inadequate response to 
the insurgency—and institutionalize what is already a “deep transformation of the networks of 
territorial power," according to El Tiempo commentator Pedro Medellin.[10] Uribe has staked his 
political career on disbanding these AUC units and, so far, he can claim considerable success—
an estimated 13,000 of the AUC’s 20,000 fighters have demobilized, with the remainder 
scheduled to turn in their weapons by February 2006.[11] “The success of the peace agreement 
with the AUC depends on him,” Ex-Vice Minister of Justice Rafael Nieto argues. “Otherwise, they 
could take up arms.”[12] The strategy that aimed to disarm and demobilize the AUC offered a 
logic. “This government is considered a friend of the AUC,” Colombian Air Force Lieutenant-
Colonel Juan Carlos Gómez notes. “Uribe needs to move beyond this and get at the guerrillas. 
This (demobilization) is a very fragile process. But the hardcore will not give up and will continue 
to fight. The AUC is like snow. They have lots of support in areas where the state has no 
authority.”[13]  
Indeed, it is unlikely that the AUC will fade quietly away for several reasons. First, many of its 
members are not keen to be punished for their crimes, even under the very magnanimous wrist-
slapping provisions of the Law of Justice and Peace passed in 2005 to facilitate the peace 
process with the AUC.[14] The AUC has witnessed the enlistment of drug lords in its ranks eager 
to wrap themselves in the mantel of AUC “patriotism” to avoid extradition to the United States. 
Indeed, because Washington may require that Colombia extradite drug criminals in order to claim 
$600 million in aide, the current campaign for the Colombian Congress is awash in AUC cash, 
much of it earned in the drug trade, to insure that AUC influence remains strong in the highest 
levels of government.  
Second, demobilization, the great success of Uribe’s first term, hangs by a thread. Paramilitary 
stand-down parades are seldom supported by meaningful government programs to reintegrate 
demobilized autodefensas into gainful employment. Therefore, many may simply drift into lives of 
crime, or remained armed and on the qui vive against a FARC resurgence.[15] The bald truth is 
that Colombia is a warfare state, so that combat and violence are the only métier that generations 
of young Colombian men and women know. Indeed, indications are that the paramilitaries are 
actually augmenting their power by taking advantage of Uribe’s “Democratic Security” strategy to 
move in behind the army as it clears out once FARC-controlled areas, to extend their illegal 
activities including cocaine trafficking, kidnapping and murder, and even infiltrating important 
institutions like Congress and the DAS, the government’s primary intelligence agency.[16] If Uribe 
is perceived as being soft on the FARC, the AUC may abandon the pretence of demobilization 
altogether.[17] 
The good news for Uribe is that insurgency appears to be in a deep stall. The ELN leadership 
believed that they could create revolutionary conditions, especially if they siphoned off oil 
revenues in Arauca, Colombia’s oil-rich eastern state that borders on Venezuela, to build 
communities. “But the ELN can’t survive for more than five years,” Vice Minister of Defense J.M. 
Eastman believes. “They don’t have the military power even to negotiate. They are hemorrhaging 
soldiers into the paramilitaries.”[18] Even should the ELN conclude a truce in Havana, the effects 
would be more psychological than practical—it counts few soldiers, and many of its local units are 
already controlled by the FARC. The FARC, too, is undoubtedly weakened, but opinion is divided 
on how much.[19] Steven Dudley, who visited a FARC rally in the Despeje in 2000, came away 
with the impression that he had witnessed a hollow pantomime, during which an ageing 
leadership mouthed empty “Bolivarian” slogans before a half-passive, have-fearful campesino 
audience coerced into attendance.[20]  
The movement has trouble constructing an urban agenda. While it understands that it must 
conquer the cities to win, and has attempted to create urban cells and even reach out to 
university students by offering scholarships, Colombian city dwellers regard the FARC as a 
collection of violent bumpkins whose rural political agenda holds little appeal.[21] “They are very 
rural people, very campesinos, their agenda is very local,” Eastman, who has experience in 
negotiating with guerrillas, noted. They are losing operational capacity in Cundinamarca and on 
the Atlantic coast. Plan Patriota, as the recent U.S.-Colombian counter-terrorism campaign is 
called, has disrupted their communications, most notably the web of “strategic corridors” that run 
through the country for the transport of troops, arms, and drugs, and threatened their base in the 
southeast of the country. “The FARC is beginning to retreat, and to fight at a distance using 
snipers and explosives,” Nieto contends. The government has enjoyed some success targeting 
mid-level FARC leaders, a critical link in a movement that recruits among children and ill-
educated campesinos, and whose op-tempo of late has left little time for political indoctrination 
and what might be called “professional development.”[22] Desertions are around eight thousand, 
and growing daily. 
Nevertheless, Colombian journalist Alfredo Rangel believes that it is too early to declare victory. 
“The FARC is weakened but far from defeated. It is possible to lose what we have won. FARC’s 
retreat may be only temporary.” This summer, Rangel saw FARC in tactical retreat, not on the 
cusp of collapse. “The FARC still has its capabilities intact and conserves its capacity, in the 
South especially,” he cautions.[23] The International Crisis Group also warns that Plan Patriota 
has shot its bolt. By concentrating on the South, the government has allowed the FARC to 
expand elsewhere. The FARC’s infrastructure has sustained the worst that the government can 
throw at it and survives. The offensives against the FARC in the South have passed what 
Clausewitz calls “the culminating point of victory,” and are now actually winding down without 
decisive results. And while demonstrating “incremental success” in war is important to convince 
Colombia’s people and allies of eventual victory, “excessive triumphalism” over military victories 
has lulled the public into a false sense of success. In fact, according to this view, to sustain 
offensives against the FARC, the government would actually have to double the defense budget 
and expand the military and police by a third, “and even then there would be no guarantees.”[24] 
Indeed, the fear is that Uribe’s simultaneous offensives against the AUC, drugs, and the 
insurgents may actually bring about a temporary alliance among elements of those groups for the 
duration of the election.[25] 
Unfortunately for Uribe, the trends are actually going in the opposite direction. While government 
forces continued to hold the initiative in the south of the country, in the past months, the FARC 
has initiated vicious local offensives, massing 5 to 1 advantages against overmanned military and 
police in other areas, inflicting 14 percent casualties while taking only 5 percent. In the latest 
example of this tactic, on December 17, 2005, an estimated five hundred guerrillas from FARC 
front 47 and their ELN allies, under the command of a feared, one-eyed female commander who 
travels under the nom de guerre of “Karina,” struck at a major police post at San Marino, in 
southern Choco, using gas mortars. Eight police were killed and another thirty-three were 
captured, more pawns to be played in upcoming “humanitarian” negotiations.[26] The 
government’s offensive in oil-rich Arauca, personally selected by Uribe as a test bed for the 
success of “Democratic Security,” was seriously set back by a FARC initiated “armed strike.”  
Elsewhere, the FARC has followed the classic guerrilla strategy of breaking into small groups, 
and fighting “at a distance” with mines and booby traps.[27] While desertions from the FARC 
continued to be impressive, most are only low level, imperfectly indoctrinated soldiers, many of 
them children. There are plenty more where these came from. The Center for Integrated Action, a 
government initiative to coordinate social and economic support services to consolidate reclaimed 
FARC areas, has been starved of resources. As a result, Colombian forces have been left on 
their on, or required to tolerate—or encourage—the “assistance” of paramilitaries to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the population.[28] 
Narcotrafficking persists, and provides both the AUC and the insurgency with resources that allow 
them to resist the government. Demobilization of the paramilitaries actually benefits the FARC, 
because guerrillas have moved to fill the power vacuums in localities where the state remains 
weak or absent. Foreign policy also seems to be a problem. Alleged assassination plots against 
the president of Venezuela concocted by Colombian officers and anti-Chavez Venezuelan exiles 
have hardly made Hugo Chavez well disposed toward sealing his border. Ecuador was noticeably 
unhelpful in the summer of 2005 when FARC guerrillas crossed the Ecuadorian border willing to 
bushwhack Colombian security forces. Indeed, both Ecuadorian and Venezuelan military 
equipment has turned up in the hands of the FARC.[29] Uribe is also beginning to understand the 
disadvantages of hitching his star to U.S. support and adopting a confrontational attitude toward 
his neighbors in a region increasingly disenchanted with Washington’s policies.[30] U.S. support 
will undoubtedly diminish as aid dollars are sucked up by Iraq and Afghanistan, and now 
Hurricane Katrina. “The United States has a responsibility because it is financing 
narcotrafficking,” Nieto maintains. “U.S. aid is necessary. We can solve many of our own 
problems if cocaine goes away. I pray for the day when methamphetamines replace cocaine as 
the drug of choice in the U.S. Other Latin American countries have problems. We have drugs.”  
And while this view may be comforting to Colombians, it is unlikely to find an echo in the U.S. 
Congress, already miffed by reports of continuing human rights abuses and collusion between 
army and paramilitary groups, Uribe’s foot-dragging on extraditing drug kingpins, and the 
perception that Colombia is not doing all it could to stop drug trafficking. Indeed, indications are 
that 2006 will see a significant cut in U.S. aid to Colombia.[31] 
Rangel for one refuses to equate Uribe’s survival with that of Colombia. The belief that the FARC 
is on the ropes is, he insists, wishful thinking. Negotiations with the insurgents will happen later 
rather than sooner. “Uribe is not salvation, he is not irreplaceable. After Uribe, it won’t be the 
deluge. The good policies will continue. People say that good things began with Uribe. But things 
began before him, like Plan Colombia [which was negotiated under Uribe’s predecessor, Andrés 
Pastrana]. The disappearance of Plan Colombia would be very grave. Uribe without Plan 
Colombia cannot do great things.” “ Colombia has to persist in our strategy,” Eastman believes. 
“Public opinion has to get involved. The timetable is a problem. There is a political process that 
the elections may change. These last four years have set the priorities of the nation. This will limit 
the options of Uribe’s successor.” Indeed, La Semana columnist Marta Ruiz believes that Uribe 
and the Colombian armed forces have extracted all of the benefit that they are likely to squeeze 
out of “Democratic Security.” The question remains: do they have the capacity for self-criticism 
and course correction in the face of an altered strategic landscape?[ 32] 
Even though Uribe will likely remain in office for a second four-year term, Colombian civil-military 
relations will undoubtedly face serious challenges. Nieto speculates that, without Uribe, 
institutional development would atrophy. “This will make it difficult for Colombian institutions to 
react,” he warns, especially if the insurgency worsens. However, although Colombia remains a 
durable democracy, institutions other than the presidency and the military have evinced little 
evidence of vitality under Uribe – au contraire. And even the hint of “institutional strengthening” in 
the presidency is totally personality drive. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that Uribe’s 
popularity has more to do with the fact that he caught the wave of Pastrana’s preparation, 
Clintonesque generosity, and Bush willingness to rewrite the ROE’s (rule of engagement) for 
Colombia than with any innate charisma. To be fair to Uribe, he has been able prevent the 
military and intelligence services from pursuing their own agenda in military reform, with 
Venezuela or with the AUC. In May 2005, for instance, Uribe fired four army generals who 
protested that his U.S.-inspired reorganization of the military to impose “jointness” disadvantaged 
Colombia’s senior service. He moved to contain recent revelations of paramilitary infiltration of the 
DAS, and to stop intrigues between Colombian officers and intelligence personnel and 
Venezuelan exiles, on-going since 2003, to plot the overthrow of Hugo Chavez.[33]  
But these points of glitter do not fundamentally alter the trend lines of poor state capacity. The 
crunch may come when diminished U.S. aid combines with an economic downturn to restrict 
defense dollars. This could curtail Colombian military transformation and allow the insurgents to 
recoup some of the ground that they have lost over the past years. A loss of battlefield 
momentum combined with economic setbacks might encourage a new president to negotiate with 
insurgents, in the manner of Samper or Pastrana. This would certainly raise the hackles of the 
military, encourage a renaissance of the autodefensas, and possibly lead to an upsurge in human 
rights abuses with military, police, or intelligence complicity. Colombia lives with the legacies of its 
past, “because of the guerrillas’ penchant to destroy things and the paramilitaries’ tendency to 
thwart any change at all.”[34] And, one might add, with the Colombian military’s historic 
reluctance to place their muscle at the service of a political strategy that incorporates negotiation 
and compromise.  
Despite the fact that Colombia has been in a state of incipient civil war practically since the 
country’s founding in 1830, Colombian society’s sense of connection with the military is tenuous, 
for several reasons. First of all, the country’s elites traditionally have boycotted the military and 
shown little interest in military affairs. “ Colombia doesn’t have a strong military tradition like other 
Latin American countries,” notes Alfredo Rangel. “The military attracts lower to lower middle class. 
Those who join the officer corps are looking for social promotion.” So far, at least, Colombia 
seems to fit the “globalized” pattern, rather than offer the exception. Second, the current 
“conflicto” typically has been interpreted as a political and social rather than a security problem. 
“From the1970s to the mid-1990s, people said that we had a conflict because Colombia was a 
closed democracy with elites that oppressed the rural population,” Eastman contends. “If that’s 
the view, then the conflict is not seen as a security problem, but as a problem of democracy and 
political process, even one of economic development. So, there was no link with defense 
policies.” The theoretical basis for Colombia’s strategic approach to the war was constructed in 
the 1960s and 1970s when a group of “violentologs” at National University, the most important 
public university in Colombia, theorized that Colombia’s violence stemmed from social and 
economic inequality, and the failure of government institutions to order and arbitrate national life. 
This view influenced political, economic and social approaches to the conflict which climaxed with 
Pastrana’s offer of a zona despeje as the basis of negotiation with the FARC.[35] 
Third, polite society, urban society, has recoiled from la Guerra sucia. Without strong political 
leadership, a realistic prospect of “victory,” and some control on the “dirtiest” aspects of the dirty 
war, the Colombian people, especially city dwellers who now comprise approximately 75 percent 
of the population, will continue to remain aloof from a conflict which, because of the success of 
“Democratic Security,” has once again been exiled to the remote “frontier” areas. This must be 
part of Uribe’s calculations when he opted for an “appeasement lite” version of his predecessors’ 
once-reviled strategy of negotiations. The downside is that Uribe’s success has allowed 
Colombian society to relapse into its “why bother?” default mode. So long as the military can keep 
Colombia’s insurgencies at arm’s length, and governments can play on U.S. fears of communists, 
terrorists or drugs to extract resources from Washington, the incentive for Colombians to carry out 
the necessary reforms to put their own house in order is removed. 
Finally, narcotrafficking has transformed the nature of the conflict from the 1980s. Neo-liberals in 
the Centro de Estudios Regionales (CERE) in the Universidad de los Andes theorized in the 
1990s that poverty could not be the origins of Colombia’s problems, by demonstrating that 
insurgency prospered in areas where there were resources, not in the poorest areas. The 
problem, they said, was the weakness of the state which allowed criminal violence to spread. 
Violence caused the social situation, not vice versa. Therefore, Colombia has a security problem, 
not an economic or social problem. This has informed Uribe’s approach to the conflict. If you end 
the violence, you will fix the social problem because it will allow economic development. Not 
everyone agrees with this view. Nor is it clear how Uribe’s failure to build state capacity will 
alleviate the conditions that allow sub-state actors to prosper. Indeed, there is confusion about 
whether Colombia has a war at all, and, if so, what are its causes—ideology, poverty, or drugs? 
Most Colombians simply want to turn the “conflicto” over to the armed forces and wash their 
hands of it. 
But it is certain that in the last fifteen years, drugs have altered the dynamic of Colombian politics. 
“The old Liberal/Conservative conflict has been changed by drugs,” according to Wiesner. He 
might have added that it has also been changed by electoral reform, which has weakened, but 
hardly broken; the Liberal/Conservative stranglehold on Colombian politics. “This has broken 
down traditional party loyalty, as peasants have been driven off the land by drug barons. So, the 
country is largely apolitical. The state institutions don’t work. Impunity and corruption are rife. The 
legal system doesn’t work, so people take the law into their own hands and have no fear of being 
caught.”[36] “There isn’t a civil society here and an armed guerrilla society on the other side,” 
Colombian Communist chief Jaime Caycedo told Steven Dudley. “They are two integral parts of 
the same society.”[37] “It’s difficult to say why we have guerrillas,” Eastman reflects. “Other 
countries have poverty but no guerrillas. I think that Colombia has a national identity. It’s not that 
no one cares.” Others think that the sense of national identity is weak. “It’s hard to imagine the 
poverty in the countryside,” Juan Carlos Gómez remarked. “Outside of Bogotá, it’s really another 
country.” 
No where is the social inequality of Colombia more apparent than in the military’s conscription 
policies. While the military has taken steps to professionalize its ranks, attempts to institute a 
more equitable method of conscription that would share the burden across social classes has 
failed to gain traction. The burden of fighting the “conflicto” falls heavily on the peasantry, no 
matter which side enlists them. Colombians might admire the military from a distance, but that 
does not translate into a desire to enlist their children. Attempts by the MOD to introduce a lottery 
system in 2004 failed to get a final reading in Congress. The Constitutional Court has declared 
that only professional soldiers can be ordered into combat. The war, often intense, is localized in 
remote areas of the country. “I get calls all of the time asking how to get a son out of military 
service,” Gómez confessed. “For Colombians, the problem of the FARC is the problem of the 
government. This is reflected in conscription. We have a class system in this country. Everyone 
has an interest in the status quo—so long as I get along. I talk to my classmates. It’s a horrible 
thing to say, but they ask: ‘What will happen if we finish this war? We will lose our jobs.’ There are 
people who think like that. The same goes for the NGOs. Everyone has an interest in the status 
quo.” “We don’t have a tradition of military service in Colombia,” Eastman believes, at least not 
one for the middle classes. “Nor is it sexy to fight a civil war. People would feel more engaged if it 
were an international war. We have a terrorist threat. This is not a civil conflict between race, 
religion, ideology. The guerrillas don’t represent a population.”  
One irony of this pervasive feeling of detachment so far as the war is concerned is that the 
military remains Colombia’s most popular institution, according to opinion polls. But this does not 
necessarily translate into firm support for the war.[38] The largest cities where the majority of the 
population lives struggle to maintain a sense of normalcy. Demanding minimal sacrifices from the 
Colombian population is probably a requirement of Uribe’s—and by extension the military’s—
popularity. Because the military is taking care of the problem, the population can express its 
gratitude without actually having to make sacrifices. The military might be far less popular if more 
people, especially the middle classes, had to serve in it. 
This fundamental divide between civilians and soldiers about how this “conflicto” is to be resolved 
lies at the heart of Colombian civil-military relations, according to Alfredo Rangel. “Civilian and 
military priorities are different. The civilians want peace through dialogue. The soldiers want 
military victory. The military is very jealous about keeping their space, and keeping the civilians 
out.” War, apparently, is their space. Therefore, all of the combatants in Colombia—insurgents, 
autodefensas, and the military—offer mirror images of each other, none with a political strategy, 
all committed to a dogma of armed struggle until an elusive victory is achieved. Then what? The 
peace process under Pastrana, while welcomed among the general population, was extremely 
unpopular with the military. “The military was very opposed to the peace process,” Eastman, who 
was negotiating with the ELN, remembered. “The worse thing that you can do is to dishonor the 
military. Some soldiers saw the peace process as dishonoring the military. It didn’t hurt me, 
because I had a personal relationship with the soldiers. Besides, the ELN is really off the radar 
screen, so I was never the object of recriminations. But the FARC is something else.”  
Lt. Col. Juan Carlos Gómez lays out the worst case scenario: “Uribe is trying to change the 
culture. The government is making a huge effort. But it cannot maintain it beyond three years. 
Plan Colombia will end next year. What will Colombia do? If the FARC can demonstrate that 
Democratic Security is not working, a sort of Têt Offensive that will discredit Uribe’s policy, this 
may encourage a desire for peace at any price. We will see a return to Pastrana’s policy of 
negotiations, which was very popular. The feeling will be that the FARC is too strong and that we 
cannot win. If the Colombian population have the feeling that they are insecure, if the FARC 
begins to plant bombs in Bogotá, then there will be popular pressure for negotiations. No one 
cares if you bomb a peasant house. But if there are bombs in Bogotá, everyone cares. The 
Colombian people are not very cultured. Ask the population which day is Independence Day, half 
won’t know.”  
Fears are that Uribe’s failure could usher in a left-wing government intent on making peace based 
on “partition,” a formalized version of the zona despeje, just to get peace. “This is a historic 
moment,” Gómez believes. The FARC is in retreat. But “we are running against time. Uribe needs 
another term to defeat the FARC. The fear is that, if Uribe runs for another term, then the FARC 
will try to kill him.” Andrés Peñate, ex-Vice Minister of Defense, now director of the DAS, 
Colombia’s CIA, disingenuously argues that a “softer” approach to prosecuting the war would not 
necessarily lead to a military coup: “There is no threat of (military) intervention since Rojas Pinilla. 
The military can go on strike—‘Operation Turtle’ we call it, when the military drags their feet. 
Betancur ignored the advice of the military. We had the same problem with Pastrana. 
Negotiations destroyed morale. But they obeyed. They are Prussians.”[39] 
David Bushnell, one of the great historians of Colombia, remarked that, unlike other Latin 
American countries—Mexico or Venezuela for example—violence in Colombia is both 
widespread and endemic, but it seldom has proven an effective avenue to political power.[40] The 
political structure simply accommodates violence, absorbs it, while the population makes the 
necessary psychological adjustments, as if it were a normal condition, like rain, as American 
journalist Tina Rosenberg noted when she visited Medellín during the worst phase of drug-related 
violence in the late 1980s.[41] “It’s sad to say, but Colombia hasn’t suffered enough,” Wiesner 
suggests. “The conflict, through horrible, has been very localized. So, no options have been taken 
off the table, as with Reconstruction after the American Civil War, or Nazism and Shintoism in 
Germany and Japan in 1945.” 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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